Board Meeting
Friday, August 31, 2012
Teleconference
California State Board of Optometry
Board Meeting Notice and Agenda
Friday, August 31, 2012
4:30 p.m.
2450 Del Paso Road, Suite 105
Sacramento, CA 95834
(916) 575-7170
And
Via Telephone at the Following Locations:
2675 Saturn Avenue
Huntington Park, Ca. 90255
140 C Tower Street
Beaconsfield, Quebec H9W 6B2
7455 Silva Valley Parkway
El Dorado Hills, California 95762
2035 East Katella Avenue
Anaheim, CA 92806
111 North Hope Street, Room 340
Los Angeles CA 90012
Kaiser/Dept. of Optometry
5601 De Soto Avenue
Woodland Hills, CA 91367
3301 E. Main Street, Suite 1006
Ventura, CA 93003
FULL BOARD OPEN SESSION 4:30 p.m.
1. Call to Order – Roll Call – Establishment of a Quorum
2. Discussion & Possible Action on California Code of Regulations (CCR) §1575,
Uniform Standards Related to Substance Abuse & Disciplinary Guidelines
3. Public Comment for Items Not on the Agenda
   Note: The Board may not discuss or take action on any matter raised during this public
   comment section, except to decide whether to place the matter on the agenda of a
   future meeting [Government Code Sections 11125, 11125.7(a)]
4. Adjournment

Public Comments
Public comments will be taken on agenda items at the time the specific item is raised. Time
limitations will be determined by the Chairperson. The Board may take action on any item
listed on the agenda, unless listed as informational only. Agenda items may be taken out of
order to accommodate speakers and to maintain a quorum.

NOTICE: The meeting is accessible to the physically disabled. A person who needs a
disability-related accommodation or modification in order to participate in the meeting may
make a request by contacting Krista Eklund at (916) 575-7170 or sending a written request to
that person at the California State Board of Optometry 2450 Del Paso Road, Suite 105,
Sacramento, CA 95834. Providing your request at least five (5) business days before the
meeting will help ensure availability of the requested accommodation.

The Board of Optometry’s mission is to serve the public and optometrists by
promoting and enforcing laws and regulations which protect the health and
safety of California’s consumers, and to ensure high quality care.
To: Board Members

From: Alejandro Arredondo O.D.
      Board President

Date: August 31, 2012

Telephone: (916) 575-7170

Subject: Agenda Item 1 – Call to Order - Roll Call – Establishment of a Quorum

Dr. Alejandro Arredondo, O.D., Board President, will call the meeting to order and will call roll to establish a quorum of the Board.

Alejandro Arredondo, O.D., Board President, Professional Member

Monica Johnson, Vice President, Public Member

Alexander Kim, MBA, Secretary, Public Member

Donna Burke, Public Member

Madhu Chawla, O.D., Professional Member

Kenneth Lawenda, O.D., Professional Member

William Kysella, Public Member

Glen K. Kawaguchi, O.D. Professional Member

Fred Dubick, O.D. Professional Member
To: Board Members  
From: Andrea Leiva  
Policy Analyst  

Subject: Agenda Item 2 - Discussion & Possible Action on California Code of Regulations (CCR) §1575, Uniform Standards Related to Substance Abuse & Disciplinary Guidelines

Background:
This rulemaking package updates the Board’s disciplinary guidelines to reflect the current enforcement and probationary environment, and adds the mandatory Uniform Standards Related to Substance Abuse pursuant to Senate Bill 1441 (Ridley-Thomas, Chapter 548, Statutes of 2008). These two documents are incorporated by reference in CCR §1575. The Board approved proposed regulatory language at its September 16, 2011 meeting. The proposed regulatory language was noticed on the Board’s website and mailed to interested parties on October 21, 2011, initiating the 45-day public comment period. The comment period began on October 21, 2011 and ended on December 6, 2011. The Board received two comments at the regulatory hearing held on December 6, 2011 for this rulemaking package and accepted them.

Modified text and a 15-day comment period began on June 27, 2012 and ended on July 12, 2012 to allow the public to comment on the changes prompted by the comments received. No further comments were received and staff submitted the package for final review to the Department of Consumers Affairs (DCA) on July 31, 2012.

Issue:
DCA’s Legal Office found that the language in CCR §1575 was unclear. Specifically, sub-section (a) appears to continue to give the Board discretion as to when the Uniform Standards must be used. The Uniform Standards are mandatory and if this is not clear, the Office of Administrative Law could reject his rulemaking file. The package was returned to the Board to clarify the language prior to passing it on to the next agency for review. See Attachment 1 for Modified Text.

Furthermore, staff would like to recommend the removal of language that specifies a minimum fee of $100 per month in Condition 4, Probation Monitoring Costs. Upon review of eight DCA health boards (See Attachment 2), it was found that none of them have a specific fee in the language of their Disciplinary Guidelines. Monthly probation monitoring fees fluctuate from Respondent to Respondent, and at times may be less than $100 per month. Typically, the eight DCA health boards reviewed use a fee of $100 per month as a starting point, with the knowledge that it may change throughout the probationary term. Thus, due to the fluid nature of this fee, staff recommends that the Board remain in line with other DCA Boards and remove the language explicitly requiring a minimum fee of $100 per month. (See Attachment 3).
Lastly, staff would like to add additional supporting documents to this rulemaking package that were made available after the Board began this rulemaking. The documents to be added are as follows:

1. Legislative Counsel Bureau Opinion, October 27, 2011 (Attachment 4)
3. Department of Consumer Affairs Opinion, April 5, 2012 (Attachment 6)

These additional documents will ensure that the package is as complete as possible.

**Action Requested:**

1. Review and approve the recommended modified text and added documents, and direct staff to initiate the 15-day public comment period. If after the 15-day public comment period, no adverse comments are received, authorize the Executive Officer to make any non-substantive changes to the proposed regulation before completing the rulemaking process.

2. Reject the recommended modified text and added documents after consideration, discuss another solution, and direct staff to initiate the 15-day comment period. If after the 15-day public comment period, no adverse comments are received, authorize the Executive Officer to make any non-substantive changes to the proposed regulation before completing the rulemaking process.
Amend Section 1575 in Division 15 of Title 16 of the California Code of Regulations to read as follows:

§1575. Uniform Standards Related to Substance Abuse and Disciplinary Guidelines.

In reaching a decision on a disciplinary action under the Administrative Procedures Act (Government Code Section 11400 et seq.), the Board of Optometry shall consider the disciplinary guidelines entitled “Disciplinary Guidelines and Model Disciplinary Orders” comply with the “Uniform Standards Related to Substance Abuse and consider the Disciplinary Guidelines (DG-3 4, 5-99 9-2011-5-2012) which are hereby incorporated by reference. The Disciplinary Guidelines apply to all disciplinary matters; the Uniform Standards apply to a substance abusing licensee.

(a) Notwithstanding Subject to subdivision (b), deviation from these the dDisciplinary Guidelines and orders, including the standard terms of probation, is appropriate where the Board, in its sole discretion, determines that the facts of the particular case warrant such a deviation -for example: the presence of mitigating factors; the age of the case; evidentiary problems.

(b) If the conduct found to be a violation involves drugs and/or alcohol, the licensee shall be presumed to be a substance-abusing licensee for purposes of Section 315 of the Code. If the licensee does not rebut that presumption, then the Uniform Standards for a substance abusing licensees shall apply, unless the licensee establishes that, in his or her particular case, appropriate public protection can be provided with modification or omission of a specific standard as a term of probation.

Note: Authority cited: Sections 3025 and 3090, Business and Professions Code; and Sections 11400.20 and 11425.50(e), Government Code. Reference: Sections 315, 315.2, 315.4, 480, and 3090, 3091 and 3110, Business and Professions Code; and Sections 11400.20, 11400.21 and 11425.50(e), Government Code.
PSYCHOLOGY

§ 2964.6. An administrative disciplinary decision that imposes terms of probation may include, among other things, a requirement that the licensee who is being placed on probation pay the monetary costs associated with monitoring the probation.

Added by Stats. 1995, ch. 708 (SB 609), § 12.

17. Investigation/Enforcement Cost Recovery

Respondent shall pay to the Board its costs of investigation and enforcement in the amount of $ within the first year of probation. Such costs shall be payable to the Board of Psychology and are to be paid regardless of whether the probation is tolled. Failure to pay such costs shall be considered a violation of probation.

Respondent shall pay the costs associated with probation monitoring each and every year of probation. Such costs shall be payable to the Board of Psychology at the end of each fiscal year (June 30). Failure to pay such costs shall be considered a violation of probation. The filing of bankruptcy by respondent shall not relieve respondent of the responsibility to repay probation monitoring costs.

RESPIRATORY CARE

On their website: This standard condition requires reimbursement for actual expenses incurred to monitor the terms and conditions of probation. Currently, costs can be as low $100 per month. Collecting costs from those individuals that incur the expenses prevents other licensees in good standing from having to pay for such programs. Further, the filing of bankruptcy by a probationer does not relieve him/her of his/her responsibility to reimburse the Board for these costs.

§ 3753.1. Administrative disciplinary decision imposing terms of probation

1. (a) An administrative disciplinary decision imposing terms of probation may include, among other things, a requirement that the licensee-probationer pay the monetary costs associated with monitoring the probation.

2. (b) The board shall not renew or reinstate the license of any licensee who has failed to pay all of the costs ordered under this section once a licensee has served his or her term of probation.

BOARD OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

12. Reimbursement of Probation Program

Respondent shall reimburse the Board for the hourly costs it incurs in monitoring the probation to ensure compliance for the duration of the probation period. Reimbursement costs shall be $_________ per year/$______ per month.

DENTAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA

(9) PROBATION MONITORING COSTS: All costs incurred for probation monitoring during the entire probation shall be paid by the Respondent. The monthly cost may be adjusted as expenses are reduced or increased. Respondent's failure to comply with all terms and conditions may also cause this amount to be increased. All payments for costs are to be sent directly to the Board and must be received by the dates specified. If Respondent is unable to submit costs for any month, he or she shall be required, instead to submit an explanation of why he or she is unable to submit the costs, and the dates he or she will be able to submit the costs including payment amounts. Supporting documentation and evidence of why the Respondent is unable to make such payments must accompany this submission. In addition to any other disciplinary action taken by the Board, the probationary period will be extended.
RATIONALE: The Board has statutory authority to collect probation monitoring costs and all orders should contain this provision.

BOARD OF REGISTERED NURSING

No “Probation Monitoring Costs” condition. Language in condition 2, “Comply with the Board’s Probation Program” appears to be broad enough to permit collection of probation monitoring costs. Upon review of public disciplinary documents, language is included requiring respondents to pay probation monitoring costs, so it is collected by this Board.

When the order is revocation or surrender, cost recovery should be included as follows:
“...cost recovery should be included as follows: “If and when respondent's license is reinstated, he or she shall pay to the Board costs associated with its investigation and enforcement pursuant to Business and Professions Code Section 125.3 in the amount of $______. Respondent shall be permitted to pay these costs in a payment plan approved by the Board. Nothing in this provision shall be construed to prohibit the Board from reducing the amount of cost recovery upon reinstatement of the license.”

PHYSICAL THERAPY BOARD

Language in condition 19, “Completion of Probation” states that the respondent shall comply with all financial obligations required by the Order (e.g., cost recovery, restitution, probation costs) not later than...

Probation Monitoring Costs
Respondent shall reimburse all costs incurred by the Board for probation monitoring during the entire period of probation. Respondent will be billed at least quarterly. Such costs shall be made payable to the Physical Therapy Board of California and sent directly to the Physical Therapy Board of California. Failure to make ordered reimbursement within 60 days of the billing shall constitute a violation of the probation order.

BOARD OF OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY

None. Are in discussion to amend the BPC to obtain this authority.

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA

Probation Monitoring Costs
Respondent shall reimburse all costs incurred by the Board for probation monitoring during the entire period of probation. Respondent will be billed at least quarterly. Such costs shall be made payable to the Physical Therapy Board of California and sent directly to the Physical Therapy Board of California. Failure to make ordered reimbursement within 60 days of the billing shall constitute a violation of the probation order.

OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA

Do not have a “probation monitoring cost” condition but do collect probation monitoring costs. This was confirmed upon review of public disciplinary documents on their website.

5. Cost recovery -
The respondent is hereby ordered to reimburse the Board the amount of $______ within 90 days from the effective date of this decision for its investigative and prosecution costs. Failure to reimburse the Board’s cost of its investigation and prosecution shall constitute a violation of the probation order, unless the Board agrees in writing to payment by an installment plan because of financial hardship.
4. PROBATION MONITORING COSTS
All costs incurred for probation monitoring during the entire probation shall be paid by the Respondent. The monthly cost may be adjusted as expenses are reduced or increased. Respondent’s failure to comply with all terms and conditions may also cause this amount to be increased. The fee for probation monitoring shall start at a minimum of $100 per month.

All payments for costs are to be sent directly to the Board of Optometry and must be received by the date(s) specified. (Periods of tolling will not toll the probation monitoring costs incurred.)

If Respondent is unable to submit costs for any month, he/she shall be required, instead, to submit an explanation of why he/she is unable to submit the costs, and the date(s) he/she will be able to submit the costs, including payment amount(s). Supporting documentation and evidence of why the Respondent is unable to make such payment(s) must accompany this submission.

Respondent understands that failure to submit costs timely is a violation of probation and submission of evidence demonstrating financial hardship does not preclude the Board from pursuing further disciplinary action. However, Respondent understands that by providing evidence and supporting documentation of financial hardship it may delay further disciplinary action.

In addition to any other disciplinary action taken by the Board, an unrestricted license will not be issued at the end of the probationary period and the optometrist license will not be renewed, until such time as all probation monitoring costs have been paid. The filing of bankruptcy by the Respondent shall not relieve the Respondent of his/her responsibility to reimburse the Board for costs incurred.

5. FUNCTION AS AN OPTOMETRIST
Respondent shall function as an optometrist for a minimum of 60 hours per month for the entire term of his/her probation period.

6. NOTICE TO EMPLOYER
Respondent shall provide to the Board the names, physical addresses, mailing addresses, and telephone number of all employers and supervisors and shall give specific, written consent that the licensee authorizes the Board and the employers and supervisors to communicate regarding the licensee’s work status, performance, and monitoring. Monitoring includes, but is not limited to, any violation of any probationary term and condition.

Respondent shall be required to inform his/her employer, and each subsequent employer during the probation period, of the discipline imposed by this decision by providing his/her supervisor and director and all subsequent supervisors and directors with a copy of the decision and order, and the accusation in this matter prior to the beginning of or returning to employment or within 14 calendar days from each change in a supervisor or director.

The Respondent must ensure that the Board receives written confirmation from the employer that he/she is aware of the Discipline, on forms to be provided to the Respondent (DG-Form 1 (05/2012)). The Respondent must ensure that all reports completed by the employer are submitted from the employer directly to the Board. Respondent is responsible for contacting the Board to obtain additional forms if needed.

7. CHANGES OF EMPLOYMENT OR RESIDENCE
Respondent shall notify the Board, and appointed probation monitor in writing, of any and all changes of employment, location, and address within 14 calendar days of such change. This
October 27, 2011

Honorable Curren D. Price Jr.
Room 2053, State Capitol

HEALING ARTS BOARDS: ADOPTION OF UNIFORM STANDARDS - #1124437

Dear Senator Price:

You have asked two questions with regard to the adoption of uniform standards by the Substance Abuse Coordination Committee pursuant to Section 315 of the Business and Professions Code. You have asked whether the Substance Abuse Coordination Committee is required to adopt the uniform standards pursuant to the rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (Ch. 3.5 (commencing with Sec. 11340), Pt. 1, Div. 3, Title 2, Gov. C.). You have also asked, if the uniform standards are properly adopted by the Substance Abuse Coordination Committee, whether the healing arts boards are required to implement them.

By way of background, Section 315 of the Business and Professions Code provides as follows:

"315. (a) For the purpose of determining uniform standards that will be used by healing arts boards in dealing with substance-abusing licensees, there is established in the Department of Consumer Affairs the Substance Abuse Coordination Committee. The committee shall be comprised of the executive officers of the department’s healing arts boards established pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500), the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, the Osteopathic Medical Board of California, and a designee of the State Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs. The Director of Consumer Affairs shall chair the committee and may invite individuals or stakeholders who have particular expertise in the area of substance abuse to advise the committee.

1 All further section references are to the Business and Professions Code, unless otherwise referenced."
"(b) The committee shall be subject to the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (Article 9 (commencing with Section 11120) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code).

"(c) By January 1, 2010, the committee shall formulate uniform and specific standards in each of the following areas that each acting or board shall use in dealing with substance-abusing licensees, whether or not a board chooses to have a formal diversion program:

"(1) Specific requirements for a clinical diagnostic evaluation of the licensee, including, but not limited to, required qualifications for the providers evaluating the licensee.

"(2) Specific requirements for the temporary removal of the licensee from practice, in order to enable the licensee to undergo the clinical diagnostic evaluation described in paragraph (1) and any treatment recommended by the evaluator described in paragraph (1) and approved by the board, and specific criteria that the licensee must meet before being permitted to return to practice on a full-time or part-time basis.

"(3) Specific requirements that govern the ability of the licensing board to communicate with the licensee's employer about the licensee's status and condition.

"(4) Standards governing all aspects of required testing, including, but not limited to, frequency of testing, randomness, method of notice to the licensee, number of hours between the provision of notice and the test standards for specimen collectors, procedures used by specimen collectors, the permissible locations of testing, whether the collection process must be observed by the collector, backup testing requirements when the licensee is on vacation or otherwise unavailable for local testing, requirements for the laboratory that analyzes the specimens, and the required maximum timeframe from the test to the receipt of the result of the test.

"(5) Standards governing all aspects of group meeting attendance requirements, including, but not limited to, required qualifications for group meeting facilitators, frequency of required meeting attendance, and methods of documenting and reporting attendance or nonattendance by licensees.

"(6) Standards used in determining whether inpatient, outpatient, or other type of treatment is necessary.

"(7) Worksite monitoring requirements and standards, including, but not limited to, required qualifications of worksite monitors, required methods of monitoring by worksite monitors, and required reporting by worksite monitors.

"(8) Procedures to be followed when a licensee tests positive for a banned substance.

"(9) Procedures to be followed when a licensee is confirmed to have ingested a banned substance.
"(10) Specific consequences for major violations and minor violations. In particular, the committee shall consider the use of a deferred prosecution stipulation similar to the stipulation described in Section 1000 of the Penal Code, in which the licensee admits to self-abuse of drugs or alcohol and surrenders his or her license. That agreement is deferred by the agency unless or until the licensee commits a major violation, in which case it is revived and the license is surrendered.

"(11) Criteria that a licensee must meet in order to petition for return to practice on a full-time basis.

"(12) Criteria that a licensee must meet in order to petition for reinstatement of a full and unrestricted license.

"(13) If a board uses a private-sector vendor that provides diversion services, standards for immediate reporting by the vendor to the board of any and all noncompliance with any term of the diversion contract or probation; standards for the vendor's approval process for providers or contractors that provide diversion services, including, but not limited to, specimen collectors, group meeting facilitators, and worksite monitors; standards requiring the vendor to disapprove and discontinue the use of providers or contractors that fail to provide effective or timely diversion services; and standards for a licensee's termination from the program and referral to enforcement.

"(14) If a board uses a private-sector vendor that provides diversion services, the extent to which licensee participation in that program shall be kept confidential from the public.

"(15) If a board uses a private-sector vendor that provides diversion services, a schedule for external independent audits of the vendor's performance in adhering to the standards adopted by the committee.

"(16) Measurable criteria and standards to determine whether each board's method of dealing with substance-abusing licensees protects patients from harm and is effective in assisting its licensees in recovering from substance abuse in the long term." (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the Legislature has established in the Department of Consumer Affairs (hereafter department) the Substance Abuse Coordination Committee (subd. (a), Sec. 315, hereafter committee). The committee is comprised of the executive officers of each healing arts board within the department,4 the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, and the

4 The department's healing arts boards are those boards established under Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) to license and regulate practitioners of the healing arts. Those boards include, among others, the Dental Board of California, the Medical Board of California, the Veterinary Medical Board, and the Board of Registered Nursing.
Osteopathic Medical Board of California (hereafter, collectively, healing arts boards), and a
designee of the State Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs (Ibid.). The Director of
Consumer Affairs chairs the committee and is authorized to invite individuals or stakeholders
who have particular expertise in the area of substance abuse to advise the committee (Ibid.).

The committee is required to formulate uniform and specific standards in each of
16 areas provided by the Legislature, but otherwise has discretion to adopt the uniform
standards each healing arts board shall use in dealing with substance-abusing licensees
(subd. (c), Sec. 315). The committee adopted its initial set of uniform standards in April
2010, and revised those initial standards as recently as April 2011. Although the committee
has adopted the uniform standards pursuant to its own procedures, it has yet to adopt those
standards pursuant to the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act
(Ch. 3.5 commencing with Sec. 11340), Pt. 1, Div. 3, Title 2, Gov. C.; hereafter APA).

You have asked whether the committee is required to adopt the uniform standards
pursuant to the rulemaking procedures of the APA.

The APA establishes basic minimum procedural requirements for the adoption,
amendment, or repeal of administrative regulations by state agencies (subd. (a), Sec. 11346,
Gov. C.). The APA is applicable to the exercise of any quasi-legislative power conferred by
any statute (Ibid.). Quasi-legislative powers consist of the authority to make rules and
regulations having the force and effect of law (California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform
be superseded or modified by any subsequent legislation except to the extent that the
legislation does so expressly (subd. (a), Sec. 11346, Gov. C.).

The term "regulation" is defined for purposes of the APA to mean "every rule,
regulation, order, or standard of general application or the amendment, supplement, or
revision of any rule, regulation, order, or standard adopted by any state agency to implement,
interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure"
(Sec. 11342.600, Gov. C.; emphasis added). The APA provides that a state agency shall not
issue, utilize, enforce, or attempt to enforce any guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual,
instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule, which is a regulation under
the APA, unless properly adopted under the procedures set forth in the APA, and the Office
of Administrative Law is empowered to determine whether any such guideline, criterion,
bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule is a
regulation under the APA (Sec. 11340.5, Gov. C.).

In Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 557, 571 (hereafter
Tidewater), the California Supreme Court found as follows:

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See http://www.dca.ca.gov/about_dca/sacc/index.shtml (as of September 20,
2011).
"A regulation subject to the APA thus has two principal identifying characteristics. (See Union of American Physicians & Dentists v. Kizer (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 490, 497 [272 Cal.Rptr. 886] [describing two-part test of the Office of Administrative Law].) First, the agency must intend its rule to apply generally, rather than in a specific case. The rule need not, however, apply universally; a rule applies generally so long as it declares how a certain class of cases will be decided. (Roth v. Department of Veterans Affairs (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 622, 630 [167 Cal.Rptr. 552].) Second, the rule must ‘implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by [the agency], or ... govern [the agency’s] procedure.’ (Gov. Code, § 11342, subd. (g).)

If a policy or procedure falls within the definition of a "regulation" within the meaning of the APA, the adopting agency must comply with the procedures for formalizing the regulation, which include public notice and approval by the Office of Administrative Law (County of Butte v. Emergency Medical Services Authority (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1200). The Office of Administrative Law is required to review all regulations adopted pursuant to the APA and to make its determinations according to specified standards that include, among other things, assessing the necessity for the regulation and the regulation’s consistency with the agency’s statutory obligation to implement a statute (subd. (a), Sec. 11349.1, Gov. C.).

Applying these principles to the question presented, the uniform standards are subject to the rulemaking procedures of the APA if the following criteria are met: (1) Section 315 does not expressly preclude application of the APA, (2) the committee is a state agency under the APA, (3) the uniform standards are regulations subject to the APA, and (4) no exemption applies under the APA.

With respect to the first criterion, Section 315 is silent on the application of the APA. Thus, Section 315 does not expressly preclude application of the APA, and the APA will apply to any regulation adopted under Section 315.

We turn next to the second criterion, and whether the committee is an “agency” for purposes of the APA. The word “agency” is defined, for purposes of the APA, by several separate provisions of law. For purposes of the rulemaking procedures of the APA, “agency” is defined to mean a state agency (Sec. 11342.520, Gov. C.). That reference to state agency is defined elsewhere in the Government Code to include every state office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, and commission (subd. (a), Sec. 11000, Gov. C.). The APA does not apply to an agency in the judicial or legislative branch of the state government (subd. (a), Sec. 11340.9, Gov. C.).

Along those lines, the APA is applicable to the exercise of any quasi-legislative power conferred by any statute (subd. (a), Sec. 11346, Gov. C.). Quasi-legislative powers consist of the authority to make rules and regulations having the force and effect of law (California Advocates, supra, at p. 517). Thus, for purposes of our analysis, we think that an “agency” means any state office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission that exercises quasi-legislative powers.
Here, the committee is a state office comprised of executive officers of the healing arts boards and the Director of Consumer Affairs. Although the Legislature has set forth 16 areas in which the committee is required to adopt standards, the committee itself is required to exercise quasi-legislative powers and adopt uniform standards within those areas. Those standards shall have the force and effect of law, since the healing arts boards, as discussed more extensively below, are required to use the standards in dealing with substance-abusing licensees and the standards are required to govern matters such as when a licensee is temporarily removed from practice or subject to drug testing or work monitoring (paras. (2), (4), and (7), subd. (c), Sec. 315). Accordingly, we think the committee is an agency to which the APA applies.

As to the third criterion, two elements must be met for the uniform standards at issue to be a regulation: they must apply generally and they must implement, interpret, or make specific a law enforced or administered by the agency or that governs its procedures (Tidewater, supra, at p. 571; Sec. 11342.600, Gov. C.). Section 315 requires the committee to formulate uniform and specific standards in specified areas that each healing arts board within the department shall use when dealing with substance-abusing licensees, whether or not the board chooses to have a formal diversion program. The uniform standards will not be limited in application to particular instances or individuals but, instead, will apply generally to those licensees. Further, under this statutory scheme, the uniform standards will implement Section 315 and will be enforced and administered by, and will govern the procedures of, each healing arts board that is a member of the committee. Thus, the uniform standards are, in our view, a regulation under the APA.

Lastly, we turn to the fourth criterion, and whether the regulation is exempt from the APA. Certain policies and procedures are expressly exempted by statute from the requirement that they be adopted as regulations pursuant to the APA. In that regard, Section 11340.9 of the Government Code provides as follows:

"11340.9. This chapter does not apply to any of the following:

(a) An agency in the judicial or legislative branch of the state government.

(b) A legal ruling of counsel issued by the Franchise Tax Board or State Board of Equalization.

(c) A form prescribed by a state agency or any instructions relating to the use of the form, but this provision is not a limitation on any requirement that a regulation be adopted pursuant to this chapter when one is needed to implement the law under which the form is issued.

(d) A regulation that relates only to the internal management of the state agency.

(e) A regulation that establishes criteria or guidelines to be used by the staff of an agency in performing an audit, investigation, examination, or inspection, settling a commercial dispute, negotiating a commercial
arrangement, or in the defense, prosecution, or settlement of a case, if
disclosure of the criteria or guidelines would do any of the following:

"(1) Enable a law violator to avoid detection.
"(2) Facilitate disregard of requirements imposed by law.
"(3) Give clearly improper advantage to a person who is in an adverse
position to the state.
"(i) A regulation that embodies the only legally tenable interpretation of a
provision of law.
"(g) A regulation that establishes or fixes rates, prices, or tariffs.
"(h) A regulation that relates to the use of public works, including streets
and highways, when the effect of the regulation is indicated to the public by
means of signs or signals or when the regulation determines uniform standards
and specifications for official traffic control devices pursuant to Section 21400
of the Vehicle Code.
"(i) A regulation that is directed to a specifically named person or to a
group of persons and does not apply generally throughout the state."

None of the exemptions contained in the APA can be reasonably construed to
apply to the committee or the uniform standards to be used by the healing arts boards. In
addition, we are aware of no other applicable exemption.

Thus, because all four of the criteria are met, it is our opinion that the Substance
Abuse Coordination Committee is required to adopt the uniform standards pursuant to the
rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (Ch. 3.5 (commencing with
Sec. 11340), Prt. 1, Div. 5, Title 2, Gov. C.).

Having reached this conclusion, we next turn to whether the healing arts boards
are required to use the uniform standards if those standards are properly adopted. In
addressing that question, we apply certain established rules of statutory construction.
To ascertain the meaning of a statute, we begin with the language in which the statute is framed
given to every word, and construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided
(Lambert Steel Co. v. Heller Financial, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1040). In addition,
effect should be given to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language

As set forth above, subdivision (c) of Section 315 provides that “the committee
shall formulate uniform and specific standards in each of the following areas that each healing
arts board shall use in dealing with substance-abusing licensees, whether or not a board
chooses to have a formal diversion program” (emphasis added). Section 19 provides that
“shall” is mandatory and “may” is permissive. The word “may” is ordinarily construed as
permissive, whereas the word “shall” is ordinarily construed as mandatory (Common Cause
Here, in Section 315, the Legislature uses the term "shall" rather than "may" in providing that each healing arts board "shall use" the specific and uniform standards adopted by the committee when dealing with substance-abusing licensees. The Legislature uses the term "shall use" as compared to "shall consider," "may consider," or "may use." The Legislature's use of the term "shall" indicates that the healing arts boards are required to use the standards adopted by the committee rather than being provided the discretion to do so. Moreover, as employed in this context, the word "use" implies that the healing arts boards must implement and apply those standards rather than merely considering them. Finally, the use of the term "uniform" suggests that the Legislature intended each board to apply the same standards. If the healing arts boards were not required to use the standards as adopted by the committee, the standards employed by these boards would vary rather than being "uniform."

Notwithstanding the plain meaning of Section 315, one could argue that the enactment of Section 315.4 indicates that the Legislature intended that implementation of the uniform standards by the boards be discretionary. Section 315.4, which was added by Senate Bill No. 1172 of the 2009-10 Regular Session (Ch. 517, Stats. 2010; hereafter S.B. 1172), provides that a healing arts board "may adopt regulations authorizing the board to order a licensee on probation or in a diversion program to cease practice for major violations and when the board orders a licensee to undergo a clinical diagnostic evaluation pursuant to the uniform and specific standards adopted and authorized under Section 315."

Section 315.4 could be read to imply that a healing arts board is not required to implement those uniform standards because the board was given discretion to adopt the regulations that would allow that board to implement the standards, if necessary.

It is a maxim of statutory construction that a statute is to be construed so as to harmonize its various parts within the legislative purpose of the statute as a whole (Wells v. Marin City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 788). As discussed above, we believe that the plain meaning of Section 315 requires the healing arts boards to implement the uniform standards adopted by the committee. Thus, whether Section 315.4 indicates, to the contrary, that the Legislature intended the boards to have discretion in that regard depends upon whether there is a rational basis for harmonizing the two statutes.

In harmonizing Sections 315 and 315.4, we note that S.B. 1172 did not make any changes to Section 315, such as changing the term "shall" to "may" in subdivision (c) of Section 315 or deleting any subdivisions of Section 315. S.B. 1172 did not diminish the scope of the authority provided to the committee to adopt the uniform standards. In fact, the analysis of the Senate Committee on Business, Professions and Economic Development for S.B. 1172, dated April 19, 2010 (hereafter committee analysis), describes the purpose of S.B. 1172 and the enactment of Section 315.4, as follows:

"The Author points out that pursuant to SB 1441 (Ridley-Thomas, Chapter 548 Statutes of 2008), the DCA was required to adopt uniform guidelines on sixteen specific standards that would apply to substance abusing health care licensees, regardless of whether a board has a diversion program. Although most of the adopted guidelines do not need additional statutes for
implementation, there are a couple of changes that must be statutorily adopted to fully implement these standards. This bill seeks to provide the statutory authority to allow boards to order a licensee to cease practice if the licensee tests positive for any substance that is prohibited under the terms of the licensee's probation or diversion program, if a major violation is committed and while undergoing clinical diagnostic evaluation. (Committee analysis, at p. 4.)

The committee analysis further provides that the purpose of S.B. 1172 was to grant specific authority to implement those standards and "provide for the full implementation of the Uniform Standards" (committee analysis, at p. 11). The committee analysis at no time implies that the Legislature intended the Section 315 uniform standards to be revised or repealed by S.B. 1172 or that, in enacting Section 315.4, the Legislature intended that the implementation of the uniform standards be subject to the discretion of each healing arts board.

Thus, in our view, Section 315.4 may be reasonably construed in a manner that harmonizes it with Section 315. Specifically, we think that the intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 315.4 was not to make the uniform standards discretionary but to "provide for the full implementation of the Uniform Standards" by providing the authority to adopt regulations where the Legislature believed that further statutory authority was needed. Accordingly, we think implementation by the various healing arts boards of the uniform standards adopted under Section 315 is mandatory."

Although Section 108 and Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) authorize the healing arts boards to set standards and adopt regulations (see, for example, Secs. 1224, 1614, 2018, 2531.95, 2615, 2715, 2854, 2930, 3025, 3510, and 3546), it is an axiom of statutory construction that a particular or specific provision takes precedence over a conflicting general provision (Sec. 1859, C.C.P.; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 420, app. dism. Kubo v. Agricultural Relations Bd. (1976) 429 U.S. 802; see also Sec. 3534, Civ. C.). Thus, in our view, the specific requirement under Section 315 that the uniform standards be adopted supersedes any general provision authorizing the boards to set standards and adopt regulations.
Thus, it is our opinion that, if the uniform standards are properly adopted by the Substance Abuse Coordination Committee, the healing arts boards are required to implement them.

Very truly yours,

Diane F. Boyer-Vine
Legislative Counsel

By
Lisa M. Plummer
Deputy Legislative Counsel

LMP: syl
Memorandum

To: Doreatha Johnson
   Deputy Director & Chief Counsel
   Department of Consumer Affairs
   Legal Affairs Division

From: Kathleen A. Lynch
   Deputy Attorney General
   Government Law Section

Office of the Attorney General – Sacramento

Subject: Uniform Standards Related to Substance-Abusing Licensees (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 315 - 315.4)

Executive Summary

Issues

You asked us to review Legislative Counsel’s letter of October 27, 2011, which rendered certain opinions regarding the Substance Abuse Coordination Committee (SACC), which was created by Business and Professions Code section 315 to formulate uniform standards for use by the healing arts boards to deal with substance-abusing licensees. Legislative Counsel opined that:

(1) SACC was required to formally promulgate the uniform standards as regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and

(2) the healing arts boards are required to use such standards under Business and Professions Code sections 315.

Summary of Responses

With respect to question (1), we see things differently from Legislative Counsel, in two respects.

First, we believe that SACC’s adoption of uniform standards does not need to undergo the formal rule-making process under the APA. While other laws could potentially require the adoption of regulations when the standards are implemented by the boards (such as statutes governing particular boards or the APA’s provisions applicable to disciplinary proceedings), we disagree that section 315 itself triggers the need to issue the uniform standards as regulations.

Second, even assuming the uniform standards must be adopted as regulations, we disagree with Legislative Counsel’s apparent assumption that SACC would issue the regulations under section 315. The legislative histories of the relevant laws and statutory authorities of the
individual boards indicate that the boards would issue the regulations to implement the uniform standards.

As to question (2), we agree with Legislative Counsel that the healing arts boards must use the uniform standards under sections 315. A board cannot simply disregard a specific standard because it does not like the standard or because it believes that the standard is too cumbersome. However, some specific uniform standards themselves recognize a board’s discretion whether to order a particular action in the first place. Thus, boards still retain authority to determine if they will undertake certain types of actions if permitted under a specific uniform standard.

Statutory Background

In 2008, SACC was legislatively established within the Department of Consumer Affairs to create uniform standards to be used by the healing arts boards when addressing licensees with substance abuse problems. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 315, subd. (a); Stats. 2008, ch. 548 (SB 1441).) By January 1, 2010, SACC was required to “formulate uniform and specific standards” in 16 identified areas “that each healing arts board shall use in dealing with substance-abusing licensees, whether or not a board chooses to have a formal diversion program.” (Id. at § 315, subd. (c).) These 16 standards include requirements for: clinical diagnostic evaluation of licensees; the temporary removal of the licensee from practice for clinical diagnostic evaluation and any treatment, and criteria before being permitted to return to practice on a full-time or part-time basis; aspects of drug testing; whether inpatient, outpatient, or other type of treatment is necessary; worksite monitoring requirements and standards; consequences for major and minor violations; and criteria for a licensee to return to practice and petition for reinstatement of a full and unrestricted license. (Ibid.) SACC meetings to create these standards are subject to Bagley-Keene Act open meeting requirements. (Id. at subd. (b).)

On March 3, 2009, SACC conducted its first public hearing, which included a discussion of an overview of the diversion programs, the importance of addressing substance abuse issues for health care professionals, and the impact of allowing health care professionals who are impaired to continue to practice. (Sen. Com. on Business, Professions, and Economic Development, Analysis of SB 1172 (2010-2011 Reg. Sess.), as amended April 12, 2010.) During this meeting, SACC members agreed to draft uniform guidelines for each of the standards, and during subsequent meetings, roundtable discussions were held on the draft uniform standards, including public comments. (Ibid.) In December 2009, the Department of Consumer Affairs adopted the uniform guidelines for each of the standards required by SB 1441. (Ibid.) These standards have subsequently been amended by SACC, and the current standards were issued in April of 2011.

According to the author of SB 1441 (Ridley-Thomas), the intent of the legislation was to protect the public by ensuring that, at a minimum, a set of best practices or standards were adopted by health-care-related boards to deal with practitioners with alcohol or drug problems. (Assem. Com. on Business and Professions, Analysis of SB 1441 (2008-2009 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 16, 2008.) The legislation was also meant to ensure uniformity among the
standards established throughout the healing arts licensing boards under the Department of Consumer Affairs. (Ibid.) Specifically, the author explains:

SB 1441 is not attempting to dictate to [the health-related boards] how to run their diversion programs, but instead sets parameters for these boards. The following is true to all of these boards' diversion programs: licensees suffer from alcohol or drug abuse problems, there is a potential threat to allowing licensees with substance-abuse problems to continue to practice, actual harm is possible and, sadly, has happened. The failures of the Medical Board of California's (MBC) diversion program prove that there must be consistency when dealing with drug or alcohol issues of licensees.


In the view of its author, “[t]his bill allows the boards to continue a measure of self-governance; the standards for dealing with substance-abusing licensees determined by the commission set a floor, and boards are permitted to establish regulations above these levels.” (Ibid.)

In 2010, additional legislation was enacted to further implement section 315. Specifically, it provided that the healing arts boards, as described in section 315 and with the exception of the Board of Registered Nursing, "may adopt regulations authorizing the board to order a licensee on probation or in a diversion program to cease practice for major violations and when the board orders a licensee to undergo a clinical diagnostic evaluation pursuant to the uniform and specific standards adopted and authorized under Section 315." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 315.4, subd. (a); Stats. 2010, ch. 517 (SB 1172).) An order to cease practice does not require a formal hearing and does not constitute a disciplinary action. (Id. § 315.4 subs. (b), (c).)

According to the author of SB 1172 (Negrete McLeod), this subsequent statute was necessary "because current law does not give boards the authority to order a cease practice." (Sen. Com. on Business, Professions, and Economic Development, Analysis of SB 1172 (2010-2011 Reg. Sess.), as amended April 12, 2010.) The author explains:
Although most of the adopted guidelines do not need additional statutes for implementation, there are a few changes that must be statutorily adopted to fully implement these standards. This bill seeks to provide the statutory authority to allow boards to order a licensee to cease practice if the licensee tests positive for any substance that is prohibited under the terms of the licensee’s probation or diversion program, if a major violation is committed and while undergoing clinical diagnostic evaluation. The ability of a board to order a licensee to cease practice under these circumstances provides a delicate balance to the inherent confidentiality of diversion programs. The protection of the public remains the top priority of boards when dealing with substance abusing licensees.

(Senate Third Reading, Analysis of SB 1172 (2010-2011 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 22, 2010.)

Legal Analysis

1a. Section 315 should be construed as not requiring that the uniform standards be adopted as regulations.

Legislative Counsel opined that SACCC must adopt the uniform standards as regulations under section 315, because (1) the standards meet the definition of regulations, (2) none of the express exemptions under Government Code section 11340.9 remove them from the APA rule-making process, and (3) section 315 contains no express language precluding application of the rulemaking provisions of the APA. (October 27, 2011 Letter, p. 5.) We have a different view on the threshold issue of whether the standards qualify as a regulation under section 315.

Under the APA, a regulation is defined as “every rule, regulation, order, or standard of general application or the amendment, supplement, or revision of any rule, regulation, order, or standard adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure.” (Gov. Code, § 11342.600.) “No state agency shall issue, utilize, enforce, or attempt to enforce any guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule, which is a regulation as defined in Section 11342.600, unless [it has been adopted in compliance with the APA].” (Id. § 11340.5, subd. (a).) This requirement cannot be superseded or modified by subsequent legislation, unless the statute does so expressly. (Id. § 11346, subd. (a).)

An agency standard subject to the APA has two identifying characteristics. First, the agency must intend its rule to apply generally, rather than in a specific case. Second, the rule must “implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by [the agency], or . . . govern [the agency’s] procedure.” (Morning Star Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (2006) 38
Cal.4th 324, 333, quoting Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. et al. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 571.)

Whether a particular standard or rule is a regulation requiring APA compliance depends on the facts of each case, considering the rule in question, and the applicable statutory scheme. Generally speaking, courts tend to readily find the need for such compliance. We understand that certain healing arts boards have already adopted regulations incorporating the uniform standards. (See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 4147 [Board of Occupational Therapy].) This approach is understandable in light of the usually broad requirement that agency rules be adopted as regulations and, as noted below, may be required by other laws when they are implemented by the boards. Here, however, the wording and intent of section 315 indicate the Legislature did not intend that the initial act of formulating and adopting the uniform standards is within the purview of the formal APA rule-making process.

“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” (Bodell Const. Co. v. Trustees of California State University (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1515.) In determining that intent, courts “first examine the words of the statute itself. Under the so-called ‘plain meaning’ rule, courts seek to give the words employed by the Legislature their usual and ordinary meaning. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. However, the ‘plain meaning’ rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose. If the terms of the statute provide no definitive answer, then courts may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.” (Ibid. [citations omitted].) Courts “must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” (Ibid. [citation omitted].) “The legislative purpose will not be sacrificed to a literal construction of any part of the statute.” (Ibid.)

In Paleski v. State Department of Health Services (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 713, the Court of Appeal applied these rules of statutory construction and found that the challenged agency criteria were not required to be adopted as regulations under the APA. (Id. at pp. 728-729.) In Paleski, plaintiff challenged an agency’s criteria for the prescription of certain drugs because the department had not promulgated them in compliance with the APA. (Ibid.) The statute, however, expressly authorized the criteria to be effectuated by publishing them in a manual. (Ibid.) According to the court, the “necessary effect” of this language was that the Legislature did not intend for the broader notice procedure of the APA to apply when the agency issued the criteria. (Ibid.)

Similar reasoning should apply here. Under the plain meaning of section 315, SACC was legislatively established to create uniform standards to be used by the healing arts boards when addressing licensees with substance abuse problems. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 315, subd. (a).) The intent of the legislation was to protect the public and to ensure that minimum standards are met and to ensure uniformity among the standards established throughout the healing arts
licensing boards under the Department of Consumer affairs. (Assem. Com. on Business and Professions, Analysis of SB 1441 (2008-2009 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 16, 2008.) In formulating these uniform standards, SACC was subject to the Bagley-Keene Act, which requires noticed public meetings. Many roundtable discussions were held on the draft uniform standards, including public vetting and public comments. In that way, the affected community learned about the standards and had the opportunity to comment. This is a prime requirement and purpose of the APA rule-making process (see Gov. Code, § 11343 et seq.), but it has already been fulfilled by the procedures set forth in section 315. To now require SACC to repeat that process by promulgating the standards as regulations would make little sense and be duplicative.

Nor does the process for the formulation of the standards set forth in section 315 comport with the other purposes and procedures of the APA. During the APA rule-making process, an agency must provide various reasons, justifications, analyses, and supporting evidence for the proposed regulation. (Gov. Code, § 11346.2.) Those provisions and other provisions of the APA are intended to address the proliferation, content, and effect of regulations proposed by administrative agencies. (Id. §§ 11340, 11340.1.) Here, the agency is not proposing to adopt the uniform standards. The Legislature has required that the standards adopted by SACC, be uniform, and be used by the boards. Given this statutory mandate that they be implemented, subjecting the uniform standards to substantive review under the APA again makes little sense.  

1b. The SACC would not be the rule-making entity, even if the uniform standards would have to be adopted as regulations.

Even assuming that APA compliance was required under section 315, it is doubtful that SACC would carry the responsibility to adopt regulations. The second component of a regulation requires that the rule must “implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by [the agency], or . . . govern [the agency’s] procedure.” (Morning Star Co., supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 333.) Here, SACC was mandated to create the uniform standards to be used by separate boards; the SACC’s creation of the uniform standards does not implement,

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1 Even though the standards do not have to be promulgated as regulations by SACC under section 315, this does not mean that certain regulations would not arguably be required on the part of some or all of the boards under other statutory schemes, such as the laws applicable to a particular board or the APA’s provisions on quasi-adjudicatory proceedings. This type of analysis would require a fact specific, case-by-case study of each board’s practices and its regulatory scheme and may include consideration of: (1) whether a board’s statutory authority requires the adoption of regulations related to actions against substance-abusing licensees, (2) whether current regulations conflict with the standards, and (3) whether in an administrative adjudicative setting, the standards are considered “penalties” and thus must be adopted as regulations under section 11425.50, subdivision (e), of the Government Code.
interpret, or make any law more specific. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 315, subds. (a), (c).) The only express statutory role of the SACC is to determine the uniform standards in the first place.2

The boards are then required to use and apply the standards and have much clearer authority to adopt regulations. “Each of the boards [within the Department of Consumer Affairs] exists as a separate unit, and has the function of setting standards, holding meetings, and setting dates thereof, preparing and conducting examinations, passing upon applicants, conducting investigations of violations of laws under its jurisdiction, issuing citations and hold hearings for the revocation of licenses; and the imposing of penalties following such hearings, in so far as these powers are given by statute to each respective board.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 108.)

The legislative history for section 315 also supports this conclusion. According to its author, section 315 was adopted to protect the public by ensuring that, at a minimum, a set of best practices or standards were adopted by health care related boards to deal with practitioners with alcohol or drug problems. (Assem. Com. on Business and Professions, Analysis of SB 1441 (2008-2009 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 16, 2008, emphasis added.)3 Practically speaking, it would be difficult for the SACC (or the Department of Consumer Affairs) to draft regulations applicable to all boards, given that they are unique and deal with different subject areas, unless such regulations were adopted wholesale, on a one-size-fits-all basis. As explained below, while the healing arts boards must use the standards, they only have to use the ones that apply to their procedures.

Thus, while section 315 does not require regulations to initially adopt the standards, the boards (and not SACC) would more reasonably be tasked with this responsibility.

2. The healing arts boards must use the uniform standards to the extent that they apply.

The original language of section 315 is clear that the standards must be used. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 315, subd. (a) [“uniform standards that will be used by healing arts boards”], subd. (b) [“uniform standards . . . that each healing arts board shall use in dealing with substance-abusing licenses”].) Legislative Counsel was asked to opine on whether subsequent legislation (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 315.4) somehow made these uniform standards discretionary. We agree with

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2 The SACC is a committee formed by various executive officers of healing arts boards and other public officials formed within the Department of Consumer Affairs. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 315, subds. (a).)

3 As discussed shortly, the legislative history for follow-up legislation similarly explains that its purpose was to provide statutory authority for some healing arts boards to issue regulations to implement certain of the uniform standards. (Sen. Com. on Business, Professions, and Economic Development, Analysis of SB 1172 (2010-2011 Reg. Sess.), as amended April 12, 2010.)
Legislative Counsel’s conclusion that section 315.4 did not make the uniform standards optional. (Oct. 27, 2011, Letter, p. 9.)

Section 315.4 was enacted two years after section 315, and provides that that the healing arts boards, as described in section 315 and with the exception of the Board of Registered Nursing, “may adopt regulations authorizing the board to order a licensee on probation or in a diversion program to cease practice for major violations and when the board orders a licensee to undergo a clinical diagnostic evaluation pursuant to the uniform and specific standards adopted and authorized under Section 315.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 315.4, subd. (a); Stats. 2010, ch. 517, (SB 1172).) If a board adopts such regulations, there is nothing to indicate that use of uniform standards created under section 315 is optional. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the legislative intent. Section 314.5 was enacted for the limited purpose to give boards the authority to order a licensee to cease practice, as this was not provided for in section 315. (Sen. Com. on Business, Professions, and Economic Development, Analysis of SB 1172 (2010-2011 Reg. Sess.), as amended April 12, 2010.) By no means was the intent to transform the mandatory uniform standards of section 315 into optional suggestions. As the author explains:

Although most of the adopted guidelines do not need additional statutes for implementation, there are a few changes that must be statutorily adopted to fully implement these standards. [1] This bill seeks to provide the statutory authority to allow boards to order a licensee to cease practice if the licensee tests positive for any substance that is prohibited under the terms of the licensee’s probation or diversion program, if a major violation is committed and while undergoing clinical diagnostic evaluation.

(Senate Third Reading, Analysis of SB 1172 (2010-2011 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 22, 2010.)

In addition, some specific uniform standards themselves recognize a board’s discretion whether to order a particular action in the first place. (See e.g. Uniform Standard # 1 [“If a healing arts board orders a licensee . . . to undergo a clinical diagnosis evaluation, the following applies: . . . “].) The standards must be applied, however, if a board undertakes a particular practice or orders an action covered by the standards. A determination regarding a board’s specific application (or not) of certain uniform standards would have to be based on a fact specific, case-by-case review of each board and its regulatory scheme. However, once a board implements a procedure covered by the uniform standards, it cannot disregard the applicable uniform standard because it disagrees with the standard’s substance.

**Conclusion**

For the reasons stated above, in our view, section 315 can be read to preclude the necessity to adopt regulations when the uniform standards are issued initially. And even if regulations were required under section 315, SACC would not be tasked with this responsibility. We also
believe that the healing arts boards must use the uniform standards where an agency undertakes an action covered by the standards.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or would like to discuss the above.

:KAL

cc: Peter K. Southworth, Supervising Deputy Attorney General
MEMORANDUM

DATE April 5, 2012

TO ALL HEALING ARTS BOARDS

FROM DOREATHEA JOHNSON
Deputy Director, Legal Affairs
Department of Consumer Affairs

SUBJECT Opinion Regarding Uniform Standards for Substance-Abusing Licensees (SB 1441)

This memo addresses a number of questions that have been raised concerning the discretion of healing arts boards, with respect to the Uniform Standards for Substance-Abusing Healing Arts Licensees ("Uniform Standards") that were formulated by the Substance Abuse Coordination Committee and mandated by Business and Professions Code section 315. Previously, there have been discussions and advice rendered, opining that the boards retain the discretion to modify the Uniform Standards. This opinion, largely influenced by the fact that the rulemaking process necessarily involves the exercise of a board's discretion, has been followed by a number of boards as they completed the regulatory process.

Two opinions, one issued by the Legislative Counsel Bureau ("Legislative Counsel") dated October 27, 2011, and an informal legal opinion, rendered by the Government Law Section of the Office of the Attorney General ("Attorney General"), dated February 29, 2012, have been issued and address the discretion of the boards, in adopting the Uniform Standards. This memo is to advise the healing arts boards of this office's opinion regarding the questions raised, after a review of these two opinions. A copy of each opinion is attached for your convenience.
Questions Presented

1. Do the healing arts boards retain the discretion to modify the content of the specific terms or conditions of probation that make up the Uniform Standards?

Both Legislative Counsel and the Attorney General concluded that the healing arts boards do not have the discretion to modify the content of the specific terms or conditions of probation that make up the Uniform Standards. We concur with that conclusion.

2. Do the healing arts boards have the discretion to determine which of the Uniform Standards apply in a particular case?

Legislative Counsel opined that, unless the Uniform Standards specifically so provide, all of the Uniform Standards must be applied to cases involving substance-abusing licensees, as it was their belief that the Legislative intent was to "provide for the full implementation of the Uniform Standards." The Attorney General agreed with Legislative Counsel. Following our review and analysis of Business and Professions Code Section 315, we concur with both the Office of the Attorney General and the Legislative Counsel.

3. Is the Substance Abuse Coordination Committee (SACC) the entity with rulemaking authority over the uniform standards to be used by the healing arts boards?

The Legislative Counsel concluded that the SACC had the authority to promulgate regulations mandating that the boards implement the Uniform Standards. However, the Office of the Attorney General disagreed and concluded that the SACC was not vested with the authority to adopt regulations implementing the uniform standards. We agree with the Office of the Attorney General. It is our opinion that the authority to promulgate the regulations necessary to implement the Uniform Standards, lies with the individual boards that implement, interpret or make specific, the laws administered by those boards. As the SACC is limited to the creation or formulation of the uniform standards, but is not authorized to implement the laws of the healing arts boards, it does not have authority to adopt regulations to implement those standards. Consequently, we agree with the Attorney General's opinion that the SACC is not the rule-making entity with respect to the Uniform Standards, and therefore has no authority to adopt the Uniform Standards as regulations.

It is our recommendation that healing arts boards move forward as soon as possible to implement the mandate of Business and Professions Code section 315, as it relates to
the Uniform Standards. Some of the standards are appropriate for inclusion in an agency's disciplinary guidelines, which necessarily will involve the regulatory process. Others are administrative in nature and not appropriate for inclusion in the disciplinary guidelines. For example, Uniform Standard No. 16 which sets forth reporting requirements would not be appropriate for inclusion in disciplinary guidelines.

Please work with your assigned legal counsel to determine how best to implement the Uniform Standards. This should include a discussion as to whether: (1) the Uniform Standards should be placed in a regulation separate from the disciplinary guidelines; (2) the implementing regulation should include a definition of (or criteria by which to determine) what constitutes a "substance-abusing licensee."

It is hopeful that the foregoing information addresses your concerns with respect to the implementation of the mandatory uniform standards.

Attachments

cc: Denise Brown, DCA Director
Awet Kidane, DCA Chief Deputy Director
DCA Legal Affairs Attorneys